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powerful economic and political entities capable of turning 
traditional economic-political power structures on their 
heads, reshaping the ways that business and markets really 
works (Busch 2007, Konefal et al 2007). No country seems 
unaffected (Håkansson, 2006). 
In my view, the IMP research over the last 30 years, 
through a great number of very detailed and theoretically 
elaborated pieces of work has offered convincing arguments 
to explain what business networks are as well as to explain the 
existence of widespread, dominant interdependent business 
networks in modern economies. This conclusion seems to 
be clear. Economies are truly highly interacted. The global 
meltdown of the financial markets in 2008 demonstrated the 
argument to the degree that even the blind could see it. 
Departing from this, the tradition also returns to the 
broader picture of economic life that originally led to its own 
emergence, and asks new and important questions based on 
the assumption that the dominance of interacted business 
networks is a given, and that we in broad terms as well as 
in considerable detail do know how they work and why 
they have come to dominate over less interacted economic 
systems. We should consequently turn our eyes to some of 
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Introduction
Looking back at the business world over the last few decades, 
it is striking to note how networked it has become during 
this time (Castells 1996, Håkansson et al 2009, Marfels 
1992). Firmly organised inter-organisational networks have 
spanned across industries as well as across the globe. Business 
networks of various kinds have come to represent a dominant 
share of the international business landscape: a conglomerate 
of hyper-effective interconnected business systems generating 
and moving goods, services, input factors, money, people, 
knowledge, etc. in interacted operations in what appears 
to be from anywhere to everywhere. The information-, 
communication- and control technology revolution we have 
witnessed over this period of time has obviously been a major 
driver behind this development, by radically expanding 
capacity for network interaction, information- and 
governance-controls as well as the organisation of businesses. 
These interdependent business networks have not 
only become more effective and efficient than what may 
be associated with “independent actors’ competitive 
market” practices. They have also become extremely 
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interests to go between economic resource based powers and 
democratic political institutions. The dramatic growth of the 
networked economy represents a particular challenge – in 
part because network identities are more blurred and their 
features less understood than the classical forms of economic 
organisation as represented by unified judicially integrated 
firms or corporations. 
The challenge of dealing with the “dark side of networks” 
also applies to network researchers. 
The ambition of the paper
The aim of this paper is to start exploring into “the dark 
side of networks” with the ambition of clarifying what this 
may embrace, and furthermore to outline a few analytical 
constructs that might be useful tools for further investigations. 
One way to approach these features is to focus on observable 
economic transactions, assuming that the “dark side of 
network effects” is largely reflected in economic transactions 
between the participating actors. If observable transactions 
in the form of payments for goods and services represent a 
medium for re-distributing effects that we may also observe, 
we may start investigating what explains these re-distribution 
outcomes. That is, the analytical constructs that we need to 
develop are those that will permit us to identify and explain 
the actual mechanisms at work. 
Within the economic literature, issues of market power 
are typically dealt with within a paradigm that assumes the 
possibility of a “perfect market” represented by numerous 
sellers and buyers of homogenous products. Power is 
dealt with as some deviation from this ideal condition, as 
representation of market imperfections. There is a substantial 
literature on this topic – within what is commonly denoted 
as economic regulation and control theory within the 
broader area of industrial organisation economics. Abstract 
mathematical models and the use of formal game theory 
is a core to this kind of analysis. Much has been said about 
market power problems within this tradition. However, 
the fundamental appreciation of a networked economy 
essentially falls beyond the analytical reach of the paradigm, 
when networked economies are found to be more dominant, 
more realistic and also potentially more efficient than the 
alternatives. Hence, we also need to address these issues from 
a theoretical perspective that acknowledges the fundamental 
networked characteristics of the economy.
While much is known from the IMP and other business 
network literature about networked economies and their 
functions, substances and patterns, less appears to be 
known about the effects of emergent power patterns they 
also represent. Even though power is recognised early as an 
integral aspect of interacted networks (Kinch 1974, Wilkinson 
& Kipnis 1978, Håkansson 1982) further investigations into 
power and dominance have not been at the core of later work. 
There are some discussions of particular aspects of power 
the implications of these observations. What do business 
networks do to our economies? What are the consequences, 
and in particular; the potential dangers, of the highly 
networked business world? What are the actual and potential 
problems for businesses, for the economy and indeed for our 
societies that arise due to the domination of these expanded 
networked structures? What are their internal and external 
effects, for instance on distributions of governance controls, 
of economic gains, risks, losses and wealth accumulations? 
How can these kinds of issues be addressed and analysed?
Håkansson et al touch upon these issues when addressing 
“the dark side of networks” (2009; pp 253-254). Even though 
the characteristics of this “dark side” by no means are clearly 
spelled out and defined, they are in particular associated with 
the powers of business networks and the lasting impact of 
their mutual investments into structures that do not easily 
change or move. It concerns their wide-spread negative 
effects when they or their products fail to produce sufficient 
economic returns. But even more importantly, the “dark side 
of networks” concerns their implications for democracy. It 
definitely concerns the power-structures of our societies and 
the patterns of welfare distribution. 
Quite obviously: not everybody has become winners in 
the new networked economy. A few seem to have gained a 
lot more than the many. “There is no intrinsic fairness in a 
network. There is no reason to suppose that a network will 
provide the same opportunities for those who relate to it, that 
it will operate in some “common interest”, or that its direction, 
outcomes, or benefits will be apparent to all” (ibid, 254). 
Networks represent their own domination in relation to 
the less networked. Networks are powerful engines that may 
destroy others. Its interests do not necessarily correspond to 
the individual interests of each of the actors that it includes. 
Hence, networks contain internal power structures across 
conflicting interests. 
Furthermore, Håkansson et al points to the important 
political-economic consequences of the fact that networks 
are non-transparent and that certain actors will tend to 
dominate. They suggest as a first conclusion, that there is 
no justification for leaving networks to themselves. There 
is a need for politics to develop countervailing forces when 
the interests of the actors within a network are seriously 
unbalanced. Strong powers sometimes need to be moderated 
and weak actors need to be supported. However, as business 
landscapes are both non-transparent and complex, such 
political attempts are definitely non-trivial challenges (2009: 
254). 
Democratic societies seem to rest upon the ability to 
actually control and direct powerful economic agencies that 
may otherwise grow to dominate their societies, extract 
unreasonable rents from others and grow their economic 
resources into close associations with political institutions. 
Strong business networks may seriously corrupt democratic 
societies that truly rest upon the ability of civil society 
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such as of Bångens & Araujo (2002), Wilkinson and Young 
(2003) and Brennan, Turbull and Wilson (2003). However, 
there is a general absence of empirical research into the 
possible negative effects of networks on the economy or on 
other aspects of society and societal interests. 
As a point of departure, I hypothesize that three broad 
features are at the core of this. One is knowledge capacity, 
understood as the combination of information and analytical 
capacity that plays such an important role in strategic 
interactions. The other is transparency, in the sense that 
a given activity may be more or less sheltered form being 
observed by those affected or interested. The third is executive 
network power, which is obviously a rather multi-facetted 
phenomenon in business network settings. By focusing on 
these features, I hypothesize that it will be possible to identify 
some of the mechanisms that more precisely influence the 
dynamics and the outcomes that have been associated 
with “dark side effects”. That is, I am interested in whatever 
mechanisms cause disturbing economic re-distribution 
effects across actors that have to do with the distribution 
of knowledge capacity, transparency and executive network 
power characteristics within interacted business networks. 
In other words, in addition to the “normal price” of goods 
or a service, the associated economic transactions are 
expected to contain additional economic elements that are 
broadly associated with “dark side of networks” perceptions. 
Phenomena such as knowledge capacity, transparency and 
executive network power are obviously real, and to an analysis 
like this, they may serve as both input and output variables. 
The explanatory mechanisms will have to focus both on their 
redistributive effects and on their dynamics across successive 
transactions over time.
The three features suggested here may be seen as dimensions 
associated with particular “network positions”, which is a 
concept that has been used to describe an actor’s ability to 
influence or dominate in networks (Wilkinson 1979, Gadde 
and Mattsson 1987, Johanson and Mattsson 1992, Anderson 
et al 1998, Håkansson and Snehota 2006, Johanson and 
Vahlne 2006). Network position describes the relations of an 
actor, a firm or another organisational entity to other entities 
within the network, associated with the resources it controls. 
A network position is seen as a dynamic phenomenon 
developing over time through investments by the focal actor 
into particular relationships. The exploitation of a network 
position is argued to vary by the characteristics of the type 
of network structure, such as the degree of internal network 
structures, the homogeneity of network positions, the level of 
internal hierarchy and the exclusiveness of particular actors 
in relation to participation in other networks. The ambition 
of this paper is not to go further into this kind of typology, 
but rather to search for the mechanisms that may explain the 
emergence of particular economic patterns over time.
To embark on this, I will start by presenting a case study 
from within the Norwegian food sector. The case study has 
been conducted on the background of a long-term research 
interest in this sector over the last decade, and has more 
specifically focused on the situation within the meat industry 
and the supermarket based food retailing networks. It is based 
on multiple sources of information including interviews 
had during 2009 and 2010 with corporate managers within 
the farmer owned meat cooperative Nortura, with other 
food manufacturers as well as information from the four 
supermarket chains in Norway.
Case: The Norwegian meat industry and the 
supermarket chains
Before I get to the actual case analysis, I will present a rather 
broad background picture of the industry and of the two 
“counterparts” that represent the major actors in the three 
short cases that I will present and discuss later on.
Norway (along with Switzerland) has maintained a 
nationally protected food market policy, whereas other 
European countries have joined the transnational EU market. 
The country also has a highly concentrated food market 
with a small number of suppliers and only 4 supermarket 
chains controlling close to 100% of the consumer market. 
The Norwegian food market may then serve as a useful 
“laboratory” for studying interactions and re-distributive 
outcomes in highly concentrated networked economies. 
Since the 1930s the Norwegian agro-food industry has 
gradually become  dominated by a state-corporate governance 
system aimed at supporting domestic agricultural production, 
food production productivity and farmer incomes in the 
context of rapid growth in overall industrial productivity, 
growth in consumer purchasing capacity and overall welfare 
developments. Through this policy, farmer owned supply 
cooperatives supported by state regulatory efforts grew to 
dominate not only national markets for agricultural inputs and 
outputs, but also industrial food manufacturing, marketing 
and to some degree also distribution to food retailers around 
the country. This was typically organised through various 
regionalised organisational systems. Somewhat similar 
systems also dominated most other Northern European 
countries at the time.
From the late 1970’s this situation gradually changed 
as the food retailers and wholesalers moved to form large 
supermarket chains and to coordinate purchasing and 
distribution within these new supermarket networks. From 
having more than 700 small supermarket chains across 
Norway in 1980, four integrated food-chains gained control 
over 99% of the food retailing industry by the mid-1990s. 
This development occurred concomitantly with the global 
supply-chain revolution at the time, which emerged as an 
integral part of the revolutions in information and control 
technologies, the radical lowering of global transportation 
costs, the new international division of labor and the wave 
of market deregulations between 1975 and 1995 (Bush 
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cooperatives regime, and the super-market-supply-chain-
management regime. They represent different core positions 
in the value chains and have created competing networks 
of power in order to expand their systems and to dominate 
the terms of interaction with others. These systems interact 
with each other in productive supply chain operations. 
However, they are essentially not “on the same team”. 
They collaborate, but still fight to maintain and to expand 
their logic of control to suppress the other. Consequently, 
competition is both systemic and economic. The dynamics 
of interaction is a complex rivalry that involves all kinds of 
elements of collaboration, competition, power constructions 
and strategic games. 
The supermarket revolution
The Norwegian “supermarket revolution” can be traced back 
to 1977 when two different hard discount organisations 
(Rema and Rimi) started expanding by imitating the business 
model and the strategies of the German AldiMarkt. They 
gradually grew through entrepreneurial growth, out of 
Trondhjem and Oslo respectively, and became nationwide 
discount chain-store organisations. From the early 1990s the 
Rimi entrepreneur gradually sold his company which finally 
in 2004 became fully owned by the Swedish ICA company. 
The traditional consumer cooperative movement responded 
to these developments by initiating radical changes in the 
early 1990s to become a much more streamlined national 
organisation (Coop Norway) orchestrating and coordinating 
4-5 differently branded supermarket chains under a single 
purchasing office and a unified operational system. A similar 
restructuring of consumer cooperatives took place in the other 
Nordic countries, after which all the Nordic Coops moved 
to form Coop Norden in order to organise joint purchasing 
in international markets. Finally, a consortium of wholesale 
distributors in Oslo moved to organise all those small 
supermarket chains and food stores around the country who 
were not part of Rema, Rimi or Coop by forming a purchasing 
cooperative dominated by the wholesale distributors. From 
the early 1980s, this cooperative gradually picked up each 
and everyone, while also gradually  transforming itself into 
a much more densely organised corporation under the name 
“Norgesgruppen ASA” by the turn of the century. Like Coop, 
Norgesgruppen coordinates several branded supermarket 
chains under one centralised organisation.
Norgesgruppen currently has a 40% market share in the 
ordinary consumer market, Coop has 23%, Rema 22% and 
ICA 15%. Norgesgruppen and Rema, in addition to this, 
share the entire market for small shops like kiosks and petrol 
stations, and Norgesgruppen controls more than 60% of the 
industrial consumer market (Hotels, institutions, canteens, 
etc.) 
The ability to move from 700 organizations to 4 in less 
than two decades clearly depended on the new information- 
2007, Konefal et al 2007). Gradually agriculture also became 
influenced by the deregulatory policies as well, and bit by bit 
the sector also became more directly affected by international 
trade agreements like the WTO and EU-EEA treaties, which 
contained the room to manoeuvre for the state-farmer regime 
in shaping agricultural and food sector policies. 
Also the Norwegian supermarket-revolution emerged 
in the context of these major international drivers of 
economic change (Olsen, 2010). The centralised organising 
of the supermarket-chains and their extended governance 
capabilities into their supply chains gradually shifted the 
power-structures of the food market systems, pushing the 
traditional state-cooperative governance system aside. In 
Norway, centralisation of purchasing functions in nationally 
integrated supermarket chains inspired mergers among the 
regionalised agricultural cooperatives to form nationally 
unified corporations. By 2002-2003 the traditional federative 
cooperative structures had become hierarchically integrated 
farmer owned corporations intended to rebalance power 
positions vis à vis the integrated supermarket organisations. 
Today, there is one national dairy cooperative, Tine SA, one 
national meat cooperative, Nortura SA, and one completely 
dominant grain and feedstock cooperative, Felleskjøpet Agri 
SA.  
Through these moves, the historical state-corporate 
governance system in part managed to consolidate its 
regulatory systems in combination with maintaining 
dominant market shares in the major supply chains for 
agricultural products – in particular within the dairy-, the 
flour mill-, and the meat processing industries. 
However, following these developments, the owners of 
three of the food-retail chains are now counted among the 
richest families in the country (The fourth is the consumer 
owned cooperative, The COOP-group). All of them are 
organized on a national level and all of them are connected to 
different international supply chain collaborations in Europe. 
Norwegian food retailing has become an extremely densely 
interacted business network industry. 
At the same time, Norwegian agriculture still receives the 
highest levels of subsidies in the world and is shielded from 
foreign competition through import barriers. This market 
protection also implicitly protects industrial processing 
and marketing as well as supermarkets from direct foreign 
competition. Despite all of this, farmers’ incomes from 
food production are steadily declining and most processing 
industries are striving to survive on narrow margins, whereas 
the three largest super-market chains appear to be able to 
continue allocating rising profits. The turnaround of the 
power structures within the sector is clearly reflected in 
income distribution across the participating parties in the 
supply chains. 
The Norwegian food sector can be interpreted as an 
arena in which two different economic regimes interact and 
compete for dominance, the historical state-farmer-owned-
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result, the traditional federative governance characteristics of 
the national meat-cooperative system transformed itself into 
a hierarchical corporation under a unified board of directors 
and corporate management. Another outcome of this process 
was that the national egg- and poultry cooperative, “Prior,” 
merged with the larger red- and pork-meat cooperative, 
“Gilde,” to form Nortura - a single national farmer-owned 
unit across all variants of farm based meat production. 
Somewhat similar processes occurred within the dairy as 
well as the grains and feedstock area. That is, all the major 
areas of agricultural production in Norway. 
Since the early 1930s, Norway has developed a particular 
regulatory system to carry out agricultural politics. At the 
core of this system, there are yearly negotiations between 
the state (Ministry of Agriculture) and the farmers’ unions 
over adjustments in the system and payments to farmers. To 
carry out a fairly large share of the regulatory requirements in 
practice, the farmer-owned cooperatives have been delegated 
roles as market regulators responsible for maintaining 
market balances over time on behalf of the two negotiating 
parties. The costs associated with these regulations in the 
meat market are covered by the farmers through a complex 
system of fees and payments managed by a separate unit in 
Nortura (in this case), which is subjected to supervision and 
control by a state regulatory body. 
As part of this, the market for meat at the slaughterhouse 
node of the supply chain is also regulated such that other 
meat processors are able to purchase raw materials from 
Nortura at regulated and transparent prices and conditions of 
trade. These regulations are there to protect the competition 
in the meat processing industry, where Nortura has an overall 
market share of around 45%, whereas the rest is shared 
among several private firms. Nortura has a market share of 
68% in the primary meat supply market. 
All meat – except poultry – is subjected to such public 
market regulations, and the costs of regulation are in principle 
shared among the meat farmers. However, the ability of 
Nortura to carry out operational regulations of substantial 
meat volumes is in reality limited because much of these 
activities actually depend on what it operationally controls, 
which is not 100%, but only 68% of the primary supply market 
and 45% of the processed meat market. As a result some of the 
benefits and some of the costs are maintained in reality on the 
side of Nortura, ending up as gains or losses to the supplier-
owners of the company. In times when benefits outnumbered 
losses, more farmers became owners. Nowadays, it appears 
that the opposite is true. Farmers tend to leave the company 
to avoid parts of the collective regulatory costs. So, how come 
the market regulator with substantial delegated state powers 
ends up carrying more of the losses?  
Another important element of this historical regime is 
that it represents a continuous process of historical mergers 
in combination with closedowns of outdated factories. In the 
and control technology that became available at the 
time. Computers, digital networks, bar-codes and optical 
scanners revolutionized the way retailing and supply chain 
management was being done, increasing analytical capacity 
dramatically and allowing for data gathering far beyond 
previous levels. The data systems have become their vital 
infrastructures offering the completely necessary tools to 
control and further develop their activities, resources and 
participating actors. Hence human-machine integrated 
knowledge has been core to the transformation of the food 
sector. Expanding these networks has to do with the ability to 
expand this integrated knowledge into additional activities, 
whereby directing and controlling them.
The four supermarket chains are – for the most part – 
competitors. Because they sell more or less the same broad 
range of products, their overall competitive focus is on 
market share. Market share represents the volumes that can 
be sold by a supplier through the centralised organisational 
gateway of the chain - through which negotiations with 
suppliers are being forced. The supermarket purchasing office 
then engages in a double negotiation. On the one hand they 
negotiate prices that are carried over to the consumers as the 
prices on the given products in their shops. On the other 
hand, they negotiate the prices for getting a delivery contract 
at all, and the price of this contract naturally increases with 
the market share of the supermarket chain also in terms of 
the percentage of the price per unit supplied. This results in 
an exponential income factor with respect to the market share 
of the supermarket chain. These payments are said to cover 
various expenses such as joint marketing, but in reality they 
are mostly lump sums. These funds, accordingly, grow much 
faster in the supermarket organisation with the largest market 
share, which will tend to escalate its relative dominance when 
these financial resources are being directed towards gaining 
additional market share growth. At the opposite end, the one 
with the smallest market share will tend to lose even more, 
as retained earnings per unit sold will be lower, thus limiting 
its ability to mobilise resources necessary to turn the game 
around. (True enough; ICA is continuously losing both money 
and market share, whereas Norgesgruppen continues to grow 
and increase its profits compared to its revenues.) Powers to 
control a large share of the mass-consumer market provide 
opportunities for increasing returns organised through non-
transparent contracts and transactions. The re-distributive 
effects resulting from these transaction systems appear to 
accelerate developments towards highly unbalanced power 
structures in self-reinforcing spirals. 
The state-cooperative regime in agricultural food
Nortura SA is the farmer-owned meat cooperative that 
resulted from the mergers of all regional farmer-owned 
meat-cooperatives in Norway in between 2002 and 2007. As a 
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traditional federative cooperative system, these processes 
were negotiated, leading to a situation where the organisation 
was committed to compensate those farmers who faced 
closures of their local slaughterhouses by paying equal 
prices to all farmers and compensating them for their added 
transportation costs. Some of these costs were typically shared 
with the state, through the yearly negotiations between the 
state and the farmers’ unions. 
“Equal prices to everybody and compensation for transport 
expenses” represent a collective pooling solution which is 
fundamentally unstable. This follows because if someone can 
offer a relatively attractive supplier from within the pool a 
better contract where he can escape from the less attractive 
suppliers, he would most certainly accept the offer and leave 
the pool. And so would the next one, and so forth. Hence, 
stability of a pooled solution depends on external powers to 
maintain discipline, which, in a rule of law based democracy, 
in the end can only be guaranteed by the state. As long as the 
state supplied this kind of authority, it actually worked. 
However, since the early 1990’s the state has adopted a 
dual policy by gradually introducing a lot more competition-
oriented legislation, aimed at enhancing productivity. As a 
result, regulatory support shifted to those farmers who chose 
to leave the pooling system by guaranteeing them the right 
to leave as well as to return at no expense to themselves. 
Over time, this has carried over to the present regulatory 
system within a structure which accordingly is on the move 
from pooling to separation.  Accordingly, the historically 
negotiated compromises within the pooling system have 
come under substantial pressure, forcing Nortura to separate 
its internal pricing practices, or watch all of its best suppliers 
leave the organisation. Hence, the historical regime is 
gradually disintegrating.
Three sub-cases:  Business network power games
We shall now take a closer look at some of the interactions 
and confrontations of representatives of these two “power-
structures”, to see what we may learn about how and why 
the supermarket supply chain networks expand and appear 
to be able to obtain major re-distributive gains – in part 
at the expense of the suppliers that are dominant actors 
representing the traditional state-cooperative regime. We 
shall do this by considering what I have denoted as three 
different “games”: “The interdependent production-capacity 
game”, “The asymmetric mutual dependency game” and “The 
networked cost and benefit distributing game”. 
The interdependent production-capacity game
In early 2010, Nortura found itself under considerable 
economic pressures with declining market shares and 
growing deficits. 
The overall strategy of the company has been to maintain 
a position independent from any of the four supermarket 
chains, with a capacity on the one hand to market and sell 
its own branded products through all of them, while on the 
other hand maintaining its position as a regulator of the meat 
market on behalf of its farmer-state coordinated patronage. 
With a number of other independent processors of meat in 
the market, all supermarket chains were free to purchase a 
mix of branded products for their shelves. 
However, in 2008-09 one of the supermarket chains, Rema, 
which controls 22% of the consumer market, established 
a close alliance with one of the smaller meat processers - 
Nordfjord Kjøtt AS - in a tightly coordinated supply chain 
for meat products intended to handle the dominant share of 
future meat sales in Rema. This could be established through 
a combination of resource integration, highly rationalised 
supply chain organisation, the ability to ensure maximum 
capacity utilization in processing facilities under their 
control. In addition it increased access to a larger share of 
meat supplies from attractive farmers in combination with 
execution of the right to purchase additional raw materials 
from Nortura at state regulated prices. 
Following up on this, another supermarket-chain, Coop 
(23% market share), decided to engage in a similar strategy 
with another group of meat processers (Fatland AS). All 
of a sudden, the market regulator Nortura had become 
completely dependent on the two remaining supermarket 
chains (Norgesgruppen (NG) and ICA. With 45% of 
processed meat products at stake, there was nowhere else 
to go. By default, Nortura became the main supplier for 
Norgesgruppen. And indeed, Norgesgruppen did not have 
the option not to cooperate more closely with Nortura. They 
became dependent on one another as a result of actions taken 
by others.  
Through the new dense alliances between certain meat 
companies with Rema and Coop respectively, these meat 
manufacturers expanded their manufacturing capacities, 
ordered more regulated supplies from Nortura and enhanced 
their bidding for the most attractive of Nurtura’s supplier-
owners. As a result, Nortura’s volumes contracted and its 
capacity utilisation rates declined. To cut costs, the company 
moved to restructure its operations, only to find that the 
factories it wanted to close became takeover targets for their 
competitors – including Nortura’s local suppliers, employees 
and the support from municipal authorities, etc. 
Adding to this, Nortura discovered that it had become the 
swing producer in the meat processing industry. Through 
combinations of private label contracts with supermarket 
chains and the ability to purchase raw materials from 
Nortura at regulated prices, its competitors had established 
themselves essentially as base-load manufacturers running at 
maximum capacity utilisation levels. Both excess and peak-
load capacity to an increasing degree had to be managed by 
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Rema and Coop. Nortura, which did not seem to have the 
alternative to reject the invitation, entered negotiations 
during the autumn. The fundamental internal argument 
supporting the move was that Nortura could not afford losing 
additional market share if it was to maintain its operational 
capacity to carry out its market regulatory responsibilities.  
The negotiations between Norgesgruppen and Nortura 
ended in an agreement to establish an integrated operation 
for Norgesgruppen’s private label production for its entire 
national supermarket system. The venture was to be 
organized at a particular production facility in Hærland 
located in Østfold county in south-east Norway. As part 
of this deal, Norgesgruppen committed itself to transfer a 
number of in-house activities from back stage facilities in the 
supermarkets to the new facility and to let Nortura conduct 
these activities more effectively in a new and industrially 
automated system. Nortura committed itself to make the 
necessary investments and to arrange for an open-book policy 
of operation, accounting and control directly connected to 
Norgesgruppen’s data system. Upon signing the agreement, 
Norgesgruppen also requested an option agreement to take 
over the new facilities if Nortura for whatever reason, were 
not able to - or willing - to follow up on the investment in 
the future. 
It is easy to see that the interdependency situation requires 
mutual commitments as well as enforcement mechanisms 
aimed at securing future flexibility. The choice of location 
close to the Swedish border in the south-east corner of 
Norway clearly indicates that Norgesgruppen in reality 
forced a hedge against the possibility that import barriers in 
the future might be reduced to permit for substantial meat 
import from the EU market via Sweden. To deal with such 
a situation, the location makes perfect sense: the facility 
should be used to process imported meat, which is definitely 
not consistent with the interests of Nortura’s supplier-owners. 
Hence, it appears that Nortura has been forced to organise its 
new collaboration with Norgesgruppen in such a way as to 
prepare for its potential future unmaking?  
It furthermore seems evident, that Norgesgruppen, with 
the option agreement, in reality would be in a position to 
control a future take-over process should it so desire. This 
follows because it clearly has the capacity to make sure that 
Nortura loses money on the investment, because while 
Nortura has sunk considerable capital into the relationship, 
Norgesgruppen has full access to all relevant information and 
has the ability to renegotiate the contract, while clearly also 
having the financial resources to take control of ownership by 
executing the option. Moreover, Norgesgruppen is certainly 
in a position to lower costs related to the potential execution 
of the option, through successive rounds of negotiations over 
product prices on their private label products.
These positions are clearly understood by Nortura, which 
accordingly faces the dilemma of making a sure loss of market 
position right away by withdrawing from the collaboration, 
Nortura alone - for the entire Norwegian meat industry. The 
higher profitability from these stable full capacity productions 
permitted Nortura’s competitors, in close alliance with two 
out of four supermarket chains to compete more effectively 
for the most attractive farmers, pushing Nortura back into a 
more costly and less competitive position in the markets for 
raw materials. 
Being the swing-producer implies that you have to deal 
with all the non-planned, all the adjustments between 
expected and actual demand, all the variance that results 
from actions taken by the supermarket chains themselves 
to promote certain products over others, variances in the 
weather-dependent season products like summer-grill 
products etc. It means being responsible for all the hassle and 
the ad hoc adjustments. It also results in the need to keep peak 
load production capacity for a substantial variety of products 
and production processes. All of this is costly compared to 
the base-load manufacturer. 
Furthermore, Nortura also has significantly higher 
marketing costs, because through the supermarket networks’ 
control of the shelves and the overall marketing campaigns, 
the opportunities to discriminate Nortura are substantial. In 
order to reach the customers across all of this, Nortura has 
both to pay more for the contract to deliver, and to use more 
marketing resources on its own budgets. To compensate for 
all of this, it tends to become the price-leader in terms of 
setting the upper price-level for the various products such 
that the others can sell at lower prices with zero additional 
marketing expenses. Hence, Nortura in fact becomes a 
generic marketing engine for all meat processors. 
Is there anything Nortura can do about this? At least 
it seems impossible to expand its sales to Rema and Coop, 
as both of them have in fact become direct competitors in 
the meat processing industry with the ability to orchestrate 
sufficient price discrimination in their own shops to 
guarantee a given volume for their new manufacturing 
partners. Whatever Nortura does in the given circumstances, 
it appears that it cannot win the Rema and the Coop games.  
The protective sphere enjoyed by private meat 
manufacturers that was established by the state to prevent 
them from being exploited or suppressed by Nortura and the 
strong collective organisations of the farmers is all of a sudden 
entered into by the supermarket chains who command 
substantially greater financial resources, organizational 
capabilities and market powers. The game thereby seems 
to have been turned upside down in a struggle that also 
includes placing the burdens of excess capacity and peak-
load management costs on the weaker party.
The asymmetric mutual dependency game
During 2010 Norgesgruppen repeatedly invited Nortura 
both privately and publically, into closer collaboration, with 
the ambition of establishing operationally integrated meat 
supply activities similar to the lean structures organised by 
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cost based price competition on individual products, is rather 
a battle between organized network structures with particular 
internal distributions of payments, losses and gains.
While the prices for suppliers are not directly affected by 
the dumping of consumer prices, volumes are. If the given 
product can be supplied in large volumes in the short run, 
this is certainly not a problem for the supplier either, quite 
to the contrary. However, to meat manufacturing this is not 
the case. Meat production is about exploiting the value of 
the entire animal by producing and selling an optimal mix 
of products where relative prices of the products reflect their 
relative volumes and qualities and their respective demand 
curves in relation to one another. When a particular product 
suddenly experiences unexpected high demand due to price 
dumping decided by others, and the supplier has an obligation 
to deliver, he will end up slaughtering more animals only to 
sell a fraction of the meat. The remaining parts will go to 
storage – which starts a race to rebalance the product mix 
before product qualities deteriorates. In the end, much of it 
will go to the market at discounted prices. Hence, the actual 
costs of the competition will be carried over to actors with no 
ability to influence the decision to use their products to start 
a price war – possibly against some of their other customers, 
who will then add more weight to the problem by acting in 
their own interests as well.
What seems to be clear from this is that the market 
competition between the supermarket organisations is 
based on resource mobilizations that include the entire 
supermarket supply chain networks, and that the ways that 
this competition is carried out is certainly not decided by the 
suppliers. There is no obvious correspondence between who 
is making  the decisions, who is paying the real expenses and 
who is collecting the gains. Costs and risks are clearly being 
pushed towards the weaker parties at the periphery of the 
networks, whereas the gains are allocated to the dominant 
purchasing units representing the four gateways to the 
consumer market.
It is obvious that quite a bit of these kinds of costs will tend 
to end up by the market regulator Nortura, who will handle 
most of the added storage and then distribute the losses to 
its farmer-owners. However, it is also clear that all the meat 
manufacturers involved will suffer parts of the losses, as 
there seems to be no way that they can avoid expanding their 
own supplies of the given product in excess demand without 
storing or dumping other parts of the animal.
Analysis
The three “games” presented provide only snapshot images of 
what we may think of as “the dark sides of networks” that are 
associated with particular transaction patterns between the 
actors. On the one hand, these transaction patterns portray 
or to engage in a risky contract with the potential of future 
losses, but maintaining – at least for some time – the market 
shares needed for the continuous execution of its role as a 
market regulator. 
With this move Nortura enters the role of a private label 
supplier, by copying the maximum capacity utilisation 
production model of its competitors – associated with a 
separated production economy with information access for 
Norgesgruppen. 
However, Nortura still holds much of the swing- and 
overcapacity problem, which has become even more directly 
linked to the manufacturing and sales of Nortura’s own 
branded products that will be forced into declining volumes 
by the expanding private label productions of which it has 
now itself become a major participant.  
The networked cost- and benefit distributing game
Finally, we shall take a brief look at some of the network 
effects of the competition between the supermarket networks.
In the competition for overall market shares, the 
supermarkets seek to attract customers to their shops. 
One important way of doing this is to offer lower prices on 
certain products which have the capacity to attract additional 
customers who will subsequently also buy other products. 
It turns out that there are normally just around a dozen 
products that really do the trick on a regular basis, with a 
few more that are seasonal products. Among these, there are 
quite a few meat products.
What happens is that all of a sudden, one of the supermarket 
chains will start a price war by dumping its prices on anyone 
of these products. Soon after, the others will follow. As a 
result sales will rise as people both buy and consume more of 
these products. This is all very well, and corresponds to what 
can be expected in any normal, competitive market. Market 
competition works.
However, by moving behind the scene and getting to talk 
to those involved, it is possible to observe a little bit more 
of what is actually going on. First of all, during these price 
wars, prices are dumped well below the products’ marginal 
costs, which to the supermarket organisation is equal to the 
purchasing price they pay to their suppliers. The suppliers 
typically receive their revenues according to a fixed price 
one year contract. Secondly, the financing of such price wars 
is planned for by the supermarket chains well in advance, 
through the building of internal funds financed through the 
various supplier contracts. Hence, competition for overall 
market share is financed by the entire supermarket supply 
chain network, where a supplier who, for instance might 
deliver goods to all of the four supermarket organisations 
actually pays to all of them for the supermarket networks to 
compete with each other. There is really close to nothing that 
looks like the classical marginal cost-based price competition 
on the given product. Rather, what looks like fierce marginal 
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the weaker parties at the periphery of the business network 
structure, whereas command and profits are allocated to 
the centre. The more efficient this separation, the more 
uneven will be the income distributions generated over time 
by the network. Certain positions seem to be able to both 
appropriate dominant shares of the gains and to force others 
to appropriate intended or unintended losses.
The asymmetric mutual dependency game demonstrates 
that supply chain collaboration needs not be established on 
equal/balanced terms, even when the two parties entering 
into such a relationship appear to be relatively comparable in 
terms of size and market shares in their respective markets. 
Some nodes and some interfaces seem to be much more 
important in terms of securing real and substantial powers 
than do others. In particular, it appears that controlling the 
interface between the professional supply chains and the 
mass consumption represented by millions of non-organised 
amateurs, provides a powerbase which is different from and 
greater than controlling a dominant share of a particular 
position within the supply chains where all the actors are 
professionals and have the capacity to act strategically over 
time. The result is a negotiated solution which distributes 
downside risks to the one side and upside options to the 
other, and where the content of the economic transactions are 
outcomes of the relative powers of the two sides. In addition 
to this, fixed cost investments by the weaker party into the 
relationship provide opportunities for future hold-ups.
The networked cost and benefit distributing game 
illustrates that the network effects within interacted business 
networks are extremely important. Some of these effects have 
to do with the mobilization of resources from the periphery 
of the networks towards their most aggregated power nodes. 
These nodes make decisions on behalf of and for the benefit 
of the organisations they represent – pulling from the entire 
resource base of the networks. As a result, the gains from the 
actions primarily go to these organisations, whereas both 
positive and negative network effects roll through the entire 
network. In some situations, these network effects may turn 
out to be mostly positive for the weaker or more peripheral 
parts of the given business network, in others mostly 
negative, depending on the characteristics of the particular 
activities and the nature of the actions taken. Hence, power 
positions and non-transparency conditions generate highly 
asymmetrical economic network re-distributive effects.
It seems clear that participation in the network resource 
mobilisation is not necessarily voluntary. To some it rather 
appears to be forced, completely lacking relations to their 
own interpretations of their immediate interests. It is a 
situation where network participation forces the evaluation 
of total gains in relation to total losses. 
A striking observation from these case anecdotes is that 
business networks are not only about positive connotations 
such as “productive interactions”, “shared knowledge”, 
“learning” and “extended effort to establish more effective 
some of the internal dynamics in the networked systems 
that seem to be at the core of the broader transformation of 
societies and markets in the direction of a steady growth of 
business network domination in market economies. All of 
them also portray internal activities of networks as power-
games over command positions and internal allocations 
of losses, risks and gains, where transparency conditions, 
knowledge capacity and execution of network power are 
striking features of what we observe.
In the interdependent production-capacity game, it is 
quite clear that the non-transparency conditions of the 
supermarket network transactions which are legitimated on 
the competitive horizontal dimension where they compete 
against one another, represent a striking strategic advantage 
in the vertical dimension along the supply chains. This 
is especially so in the confrontations with the regulated 
and much more transparent primary meat supply market 
dominated by Nortura and the state-cooperative regime. 
The ability of the supermarket chains to compete with their 
own suppliers under non-transparent conditions in reality 
provides an opportunity for the supermarket chains to 
gradually force manufacturing capacity under their direct or 
indirect control. 
In the meat supply market, the ability of Nortura to 
compete with its own competitors in the meat manufacturing 
industry under conditions of non-transparency would 
have given Nortura a similar advantage, in which case its 
competitors in the meat processing industry would have lost 
substantial ground. In this case, public regulations ensure 
transparency and provide regulations aimed at balancing the 
interests of farmers against the interests of the other relatively 
smaller meat processing companies. With the new organising 
of retailing and with retailors moving into the supply chains, 
this balance is tilted – leading to very different transaction 
patterns. 
With two powerful structures at each end of the market 
in a situation with asymmetrical regulations with respect 
to transparency and regulatory intervention, the non-
transparent business networks will expand and eventually 
take control over or destabilise the other. 
It is also a striking feature of this game that it leaves very 
limited space for independent manufacturers who are in a 
sandwich position. To stay independent seems to require that 
you accept occupying only marginal niche market positions. 
The competitive market for independent suppliers evaporates 
under these conditions. 
It is similarly striking, that the patterns of the power-games 
are quite complex and do not only relate to variables like 
prices and volumes that are a core of market economic theory. 
The importance of holding contracts in such concentrated 
markets, and the ability to play the cards in such a way as 
to pass capacity utilisation problems on to others are vital 
variables as well. In integrated business networks and supply 
chain structures, the risks and losses seem to be allocated to 
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customers. Asymmetrical market regulatory structure seems 
to substantially influence these power positions – in part by 
deciding what information should be openly disclosed and 
what information can be kept secret at the core nodes of the 
business information networks. Similarly the ability of some 
of the actors to force others to convey particular kinds of 
knowledge/information appears to represent an important 
advantage as well.
Concluding discussion: Knowledge, transparency 
and powers in business networks – and the role of 
economic transactions
To conclude this discussion, I will return to the explicit 
ambition of this paper, which is to outline and clarify a 
few analytical constructs that might be useful for further 
investigation into “the dark side of networks”. This focuses 
on each of the three features “power”, “knowledge” and 
“transparency”. Adding to this, I will conclude by discussing 
the implications of this in terms of moving economic 
transactions to the center of empirical investigation.  
The case discussed represents a setting where the number 
of actors is strictly limited; hence, power as result of 
concentrated organisational control is present on all sides of 
the interactions. What is at the focus of this discussion is not 
the existence of market power, but rather the mechanisms and 
conditions associated with particular patterns of interaction 
between actors that have substantial, but different kinds of 
powers – rooted in different histories of material emergence 
of business activities, investments, regulations etc. 
Power in networks; networked powers in network 
positions
The kinds of power that I have discussed in this paper have 
to do with/are powers of particular nodes within networks, 
where the power is represented and executed in relation 
to the counterparts it interacts with. In this sense it is both 
positional and relational such as described by the IMP 
literature.
However, in order to discuss power in the context of 
business networks, we need to clarify what we mean by 
“power” and what concept of power would be appropriate for 
this kind of analysis. First of all, I believe power should be 
understood in its classical as well as its everyday meaning, 
that it is defined by the ability of some actor to force others 
to do what they would not themselves choose to do (Beethan, 
1991). From business network research, we also know that 
power is represented by established structures, investments 
and all the material and systemic elements that have been 
put in place at substantial cost and over long periods of 
time. Power is somehow baked into the structures and 
the mechanisms they represent. Furthermore, in business 
network research the powers we look at should at least have 
some clearly identifiable economic implications, for instance 
and efficient economic activities,” etc. It also involves a 
number of power issues that decide on the re-configurations 
of industries over time as well as on the allocations of 
gains, risks and losses. It seems to be quite clear that even 
though Nortura has a much more dominant market share 
in meat supply than Norgesgruppen has in the food-retail 
market, Norgesgruppen clearly holds the upper hand in 
their relationship due to its negotiating position, its financial 
strengths and its direct interface with the mass-consumer 
market. Hence, power based on network position tends to 
dominate the traditional market share based market power 
argument. 
Furthermore, it is evident that these power issues 
are immensely important for the understanding of how 
interdependent business networks actually work and how 
they generate particular outcomes over time that we may for 
instance observe as expanded business network structures 
with tremendous capacities to act across organisational 
interfaces. 
It is also evident from the case, that power positions in 
concentrated business networks may have crucial impact on 
the distribution of gains across the participating resources, 
activities and actors, and that these power-based allocations 
may have a significant impact on the structures that emerge 
within any particular industry – beyond what can reasonably 
be derived from economic efficiency arguments or from 
creative business interaction effects. In particular, “sandwich” 
positions in between powerful actors, are very problematic. 
Powers executed within as well as by business networks seem 
to represent an economic governance problem that extends 
from the traditional focus on monopolies, oligopolies etc. 
that for quite some time have been subjected to political- 
and market regulations. The powers of business networks 
to concentrate economic rewards in the hands of few and 
their capacities to execute market power across the network 
structures create serious challenges to economic regulators 
and policy makers. 
The case presented furthermore illustrates how power 
positions also decide on the allocation of risks and losses 
across the networks. The more powerful actors within 
the networks obviously execute their powers by means of 
redistributing financial risks, losses and difficult to handle 
market roles such as peak-load supply and excess production 
capacity to the weaker actors. It is also clear, that the sources 
of weakness and vulnerability are multiple, and that the 
overall exposure depends on the composition of market roles 
and obligations as well on the outcomes of the ongoing re-
configurations of the business networks themselves. Rapid 
reconfigurations of resources and activities may move actor 
positions quite substantially, with severe implications for the 
distribution of gains, risks and losses.  
One of the features that represent a particularly 
important element of power, is the capacity of a given 
actor to compete directly with its own suppliers or its own 
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be even more key. It has radically enlarged the capacity to 
facilitate extended organising as well as the capacity to act 
on the basis of massive analytical capacities and capabilities. 
It has furthermore obviously expanded the role of economic 
agency far beyond its usual association with ownership 
control over particular judicial entities/firms. 
The role of knowledge has been given substantial 
attention within business network research, in particular 
in the perspective that it is a major constituent of what a 
business network really is and how it works. Everywhere 
where heterogeneous resources, activities and actors interact, 
knowledge is a necessary ingredient for generating economic 
results, for holding the networks together and for improving, 
changing or otherwise managing within the networked 
context. It is contained in the very essence and meaning of 
the term “relationship”, as a relationship without knowledge, 
would obviously be irrelevant in whatever economic context 
we might think of. 
What stands out as particularly important on the 
background of the case presented in this paper is the way 
access to information is organised, controlled and distributed, 
and secondly, how access to volumes of relevant data across 
the network is channelled into nodes which represent 
substantial analytical capacities and capabilities. The ability 
of the supermarket chains to demand access to data from 
their suppliers, and their capacity to analyse these datasets 
across multiple supply channels, give them a knowledge 
capacity advantage within the overall supply chain network, 
as the reverse flow of data is a lot more constrained. The vital 
engines of knowledge capacity generation that appear to 
have substantial impact at the overall level of analysis can be 
represented as the interaction of particular flows of data into 
particular nodes of analytical capacity. What these flows are 
and what these nodes contain can be empirically investigated, 
provided the researcher gets access. 
Transparency in networks; networked transparency and 
external visibility
When addressing the transparency issue there are at least 
two different notions that should be kept apart. One is 
transparency within the network as observed by the actors 
within the network itself. This we may call relational 
transparency. The other concerns the ability of anyone with 
an interest in the matter to observe what is going on. This we 
may call external transparency or visibility.
From the case presented, we may suggest that external 
transparency to a significant extend depends on explicit 
market regulations that are there to ensure disclosure of 
important information. “The more regulated, the more 
transparent, and the more competitive the less transparent” 
- might be suggested as a working hypothesis. However, 
researchers as well as government institutions and private 
in terms of distribution of profits, risks and losses. 
As an analytical concept of power for studying the 
particular powers associated with a particular node within a 
network, we may apply the construct of power presented by 
ANT. It suggests that power analytically can be represented by 
a chain of power elements that are being created, mobilised 
and linked by those seeking to expand their activities 
and resources into the world (Latour, 1991). Each of these 
elements may add additional weight to the linked entity 
that represents “the power” in such a way that the various 
elements support the powers of the entire “power-chain”. To 
describe the power is to describe the chained entities. 
It furthermore assumes that some of the linked entities are 
more important than others, and that the failure of important 
entities may cause the entire power-chain to substantially 
weaken and eventually to disintegrate. Hence, there is no 
priori power given in and by itself, only associated entities that 
are being mobilised to achieve the expansions, stabilisations 
and persuasiveness of particular actors dominating the 
network node we are studying.
The advantage of this concept of power is that it is a very 
flexible construct, which does not associate with conceptions 
of power where particular powers are somehow pre-given and 
stable. Power is something that emerges in particular historical 
settings that may stabilise or dissolve depending on the actual 
emergence of history. The content and reality of actual power 
is thereby handed over to be investigated empirically. To us 
then, the powers associated with business networks are not 
pre-given in the nature of business networks, but concretely 
associated with the particular resources, activities and actors 
of which they are made in each and every instance. As such 
I think this is quite consistent with the underlying analytical 
conception of power within the IMP tradition, which 
however tends to be more explicit when characterising the 
typical patterns of power that can analytically be observed 
than it has been about explaining some underlying analytical 
characteristic of “the concept of power”.
A power position is thereby represented by the position 
from where it is possible to mobilise the chains of powerful 
elements associated with a given node in a business network. 
This obviously includes what is typically associated with 
positional power, relational power, resource based power, 
political and regulatory powers ,etc. 
Knowledge in networks; networked information and 
analytical capabilities
When calling attention to how companies handle their 
knowledge in relation to extended business networks 
into which they are embedded, the role of information 
technologies can hardly be overstated. When talking about 
the kinds of knowledge that companies possess, search for 
and organise, interact with and maybe share internally as 
well as externally, modern information technology seems to 
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economic elements that result from what, as a point of 
departure, has been associated with “the dark side of network” 
effects. By focusing on patterns of transaction and the content 
of transactions, more of “these dark sides of networks” could 
possibly be revealed to us as well as better explanations about 
what mechanisms are involved and what their consequences 
are likely to be over time. 
However, a  “pattern of transactions” is nonetheless not a 
clearly defined thing , that we can easily observe and analyse. 
It cannot be reduced to a summary of individual economic 
transactions, because what we need to address is both the 
major qualitative dimensions of the transactions over time 
and across interrelated resources, activities and actors. It is 
a kind of structural pattern where the challenge is to obtain 
information about it over time – to both analyse its structures 
and its dynamics. This is not easy, and the accounts that are 
presented here are obviously only “snapshots”.  More work 
will obviously have to be conducted to improve both the 
clarity and the usefulness of a research approach aimed at 
investigating these economic patterns.
References
Anderson, H., V. Havila, P. Andersen and A. Halinen, 
1998: Position and Role – Conceptualizing Dynamics in 
Business Networks. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 
14(3), pp 167-186
Beethan, D, 1991: The Legitimation of Power, London, 
Macmillan
Brennan, D.R, P.W. Turbull and D.T. Wilson, 2003: Dyadic 
Adaptation in Business-to-Business Markets, European 
Journal of Marketing, 37(11/12), pp 1636-1666
Busch, L, 2007: Performing the Economy, Performing 
Science: From Neoclassical to Supply Chain Models in the 
Agrifood Sector. Economy and Society, 36 (3), 439-468
Bångens, L. and L. Araujo, 2002: The Structures and Processes 
of Learning: A Case Study, Journal of Business Research, 
55(7), pp 571-581
Castells, M., 1996: The Rice of the Networked Society. Oxford: 
Blackwell
Gadde, L. E. and L. G. Mattsson, 1987 : Stability and Change 
in Network Relationship, International Journal of Research 
in Marketing; Vol.4; pp.29-41.
Håkansson, H. (ed), 1982: International Marketing and 
Purchasing of Industrial Goods: An Interaction Approach. 
Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
Håkansson, H., 2006: Business Relationships and Networks: 
Consequences for Economic Policy. Antitrust Bulletin, 
51(1), 143-163
Håkansson, H. and I. Snehota, 2006: No business is an island: 
The network concept of business strategy. Scandinavian 
Journal of Management: Classics and Bridges to the Future, 
22(3), pp 256-270
consultancy and information service firms investigate, collect 
data and present such information for free or for a fee. Hence, 
external transparency varies with externally published data.
Relational transparency on the other hand, is different. 
This is something that goes on within a relationship where 
both power relations and knowledge (as I have defined 
it here) appear to be vital. Relational transparency may 
be seen as both an aspect of power and as a condition for 
it. The same goes for knowledge capacity. Because of the 
complexity and lack of real overview of what is relevant 
information to know about the other, what matters seems to 
be the structure of information exchange that results from 
negotiated agreements, the implementation of particular 
software based information systems and the inclusion of 
these data sets into the “knowledge engines” at each side 
of the relationship. The structure of this, essentially decides 
the distribution of relational transparency. Hence, the more 
powerful side will tend to develop its powers through forced 
access to information flows illuminating the activities of 
others throughout the network, whereas the less powerful 
will end up with limited access to information in the opposite 
direction. To rebalance the relationship, the less informed will 
have to move much more decisively and with focus in order 
to expand its “knowledge engine” into those areas that are 
really important to it. Hence, relational transparency could 
be investigated by focusing on the information gathering 
and knowledge developing strategies of the actors at different 
sides of a given relationship.
Transactions in networks; transaction content and re-
distribution of economic effects 
When studying what business networks actually do to our 
economies the focus is moved from the internal features to 
the aggregated internal as well as external effects at a more 
meso- or macro-oriented level of analysis, which should be 
rooted in an appropriate micro-economic approach. As we 
are economists, the focus of attention should be kept on the 
economic effects, which also include economic governance 
and economic policy effects and implications. One possible 
way to address this  is to start with a focus on internal 
economic transactions.
Transactions in the form of payments for goods and 
services are the media for many of the distribution effects 
that aggregate into the kinds of broader implications of the 
networked economy. Economic distribution effects across 
actors that have to do with the distribution of knowledge, 
transparency and power characteristics, involve economic 
transactions. This implies that power-, transparency- and 
knowledge effects must be “contained” in the particular 
transactions within networks. In other words, in addition 
to the “normal price” of a goods or a service, the associated 
economic transactions are expected to contain additional 
106The IMP Journal Volume 5. Issue 2, 2011
Håkansson, H., D. Ford, L-E Gadde, I. Snehota and A. 
Waluszewski, 2009: Business in Networks. John Wiley & 
Sons
Johanson, J. and J-E. Vahlne, 2006: Commitment and 
Opportunity Development in the Internationalization 
Process: A Note on the Uppsala Internationalization 
Process Model. Management International Review, 46(2), 
pp 165-178
Johanson, J. and L-G- Mattsson, 1992: Network positions and 
strategic actions: An analytical framework. In B. Axelsson 
and G. Easton (eds.), Industrial networks: A new view of 
reality, pp 205-217, London, Routledge
Kinch, N. 1974: Utlandsetableringar inom massa- och 
pappersindustrin. En studie av olika metoder att 
handtera en osäker marknad. In J-E. Vahlne (ed.), 
Företagsekonomisk forskning och industriellt företagande 
(pp. 61-85). Stockholm: Norstedts.
Konefal, J, C. Bain, M. Mascerenhas and L. Busch, 2007: 
Supermarkets and Supply Chains in North America, in 
L. Bush (ed): Supermarkets and Agri-food Supply Chains: 
Transformations in the Production and Consumption of 
Foods, 270-290, London, Edward Elgar
Latour, B, 1991: Technology is Society Made Durable, in J. Law 
(ed.): A Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology 
and Domination. London/New York. Routledge
Marfels, C., 1992: Concentration and buying power: The 
case of German food distribution. International Review of 
Retail, Distribution & Consumer Research, 2 (3), 233-244
OECD, 2009: Statistical handbook. Income distributions in 
OECD countries
Olsen, P.I., 2010: Norsk mat etter supermarkedsrevolusjonen. 
Unipub, Oslo
Reich, R.B., 2007: Supercapitalism. The Transformation of 
Business, Democracy and Everyday Life. New York, Alfred 
A. Knopf, Random House
Wilkonson, I., 1973: Power and influence structures in 
distribution channels, European Journal of Marketing, 
7(2), 119-129
Wilkinson, I., 1979: Power and Satisfaction in Channels of 
Distribution, Journal of Retailing, 55, 79-94
Wilkinson, I. and D. Kipnis, 1978: Interfirm use of power. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 63(3), pp 315-320
Wilkinson, I. and L. Young, 2003: A view from the edge, 
Marketing theory, 3(1), 179
Per Ingvar Olsen, Associate Professor, Department of 
Innovation and Economic Organisation, BI Norwegian 
Business School, 0442 Oslo, Norway. Email: per.i.olsen@
bi.no
